University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 23

Issue 1

Article 7

12-1-2015

Actions and Reactions: The Evolution of Environmental Common
Law and Judicial Activism in India and the United States
Elizabeth B. Fata

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Elizabeth B. Fata, Actions and Reactions: The Evolution of Environmental Common Law and Judicial
Activism in India and the United States, 23 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 215 (2015)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol23/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami International and Comparative
Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

ACTIONS AND REACTIONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMON LAW AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN
INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES
Elizabeth Fata
I. SETTING THE SCENE: THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND
GOVERNMENTAL BACKDROP..........................................217
II. COMMON LAW AND COMMON GROUND: A PRELEGISLATIVE DISCUSSION................................................221
A. INDIA..........................................................................222
B. THE UNITED STATES..................................................223
III. BIG BANG: THE CATALYST FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT......................................................................224
A. INDIA: A STATE OF EMERGENCY...............................224
B. THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT...........227
IV. ROLLING STONES: THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
JURISPRUDENCE...............................................................229
A. INDIA .........................................................................229
B. THE UNITED STATES..................................................236
V. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY............................245
A. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.........................................245
B. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL NECESSITY..............248
C. LEGISLATION............................................................. 250
D. IMPLICATIONS OF ACTIVISM......................................251
VI. A PROPOSITION................................................................253

216

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 23

“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful
committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it’s the
only thing that ever has.”1
What is a court really, but a group of thoughtful
committed citizens? Yet when extending this philosophical
sentiment to a supposedly apolitical, unbiased judiciary,
does the adage somehow become tainted? Should judges be
changing the world or simply maintaining and enforcing the
status quo? This paper seeks to explore those two seemingly
opposed perspectives through the real life prototypes of
environmental law in India and the United States. This note
will additionally conclude that the most effective and legally
sound path to effectuate environmental protection is for the
United States Judiciary to adopt the right to a clean
environment as a fundamental one.
With common British roots, India and the United
States present a unique opportunity for comparison,
especially in the field of environmental law. Both countries
encompass a colossal amount of territory and support large
populations. Yet they differ vastly in many respects,
including the state of their environment and the resulting
health and wellbeing of their citizens. This paper will
address the evolution of each country’s environmental

J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Miami School of Law; B.S. 2012,
University of Florida. Many thanks to Professor Williamson for his
continued guidance on this endeavor and the University of Miami
International and Comparative Law Review for their facilitation and
review. Additionally, I would like to thank my family—Faye, Alan,
Johnathon, and Josh—for their ongoing inspiration, support, and
encouragement of my love of nature, law, and everything in between.
1 Margaret Mead (1901-1978) An Anthropology of Human Freedom, THE
INSTITUTE
FOR
INTERCULTURAL
STUDIES
(Nov.
19,
2015),
http://www.interculturalstudies.org/Mead/biography.html.
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policy within its court system and the societal changes that
served as the catalyst for those advancements. The paper
will focus specifically on judicial activism and the growth of
environmental law in the common law system. It will further
discuss why each country’s courts were able to take such
radically different approaches and how the U.S. approach is
in need of a substantial paradigm shift.
Part I will provide some background on both
countries’ environmental conditions and a foundational
overview of the Indian governmental system. Part II will
address the common law remedies to environmental harms
that existed in both countries before the development of
legislative remedies and the expansion of each country’s
environmental movements. Part III will then discuss the
catalyst that motivated each country to earnestly consider
the environmental destruction and degradation occurring
around it. Part IV will focus on the common law
developments in the new era of judicial activism and social
change in each country. Finally, Part V will focus on why the
two countries had such divergent paths after the 1970s, and
the pros, cons, and implications of each approach. The paper
will conclude in Part VI with a recommendation for the U.S.
Judiciary to adopt a new perspective.
I. SETTING THE SCENE: THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND
GOVERNMENTAL BACKDROP
Due to a multitude of factors, environmental
conditions in India and the United States are suffering. As of
yet, the actions of both governments have been insufficient
to reverse the trend of environmental degradation. In a
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survey of 178 countries’ environmental conditions, India
ranked 155th.2 Today, India’s capital city, Delhi, is the most
polluted city in the world.3 In a survey of the top twenty
world economies, thirteen of the world’s twenty most
polluted cities were in India.4 70 percent of the surface water
in India is polluted,5 and smoke from cooking fires alone—
not even considering other types of air pollution—claims
about one million lives every year.6 Poverty remains both a
cause and consequence of resource degradation.7
In comparison, the United States’ environmental
conditions ranked 33rd out of 178 countries on the
environmental performance index.8 Although this puts the
U.S. in the top 20 percent for best environmental conditions
worldwide, between 40 and 45 percent of all surface water in
the U.S. is still polluted,9 and the aggregate of all types of air

India,
ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE
INDEX,
YALE
U.,
http://epi.yale.edu/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
3
Indian
Winter,
THE
ECONOMIST,
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21642172-narendra-modishould-learn-chinas-mistakes-its-too-late-indian-winter (last visited Feb.
7, 2015).
4 India: Green Growth – Overcoming Environment Challenges to Promote
Development,
THE
WORLD
BANK
(Mar.
6,
2014),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/03/06/greengrowth-overcoming-india-environment-challenges-promotedevelopment?cid=SAR_TTWBSAREN_EXT.
5
India-Environment,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
THE
NATIONS,
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/IndiaENVIRONMENT.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
6 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 3.
7 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 4.
8 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX, supra note 2.
9 Patricia Hemminger, Water Pollution: Fresh Water, ENCYLOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/water_pollution.aspx#2
(last
visited Feb. 9, 2015).
2
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pollution in the U.S. causes 200,000 deaths annually.10 While
these are not inspiring statistics, the environmental
conditions in the U.S. seem pristine in comparison to the
abysmal circumstances in India.
Before conducting a comparison of the environmental
laws that have impacted these sobering statistics in India
and the United States, it is important to first note the
similarities and differences in their legal systems and
governmental structures. For the purposes of this note, I will
focus on exploring the structure of India’s government and
judiciary and assume the reader possesses a more in-depth
understanding of the United States legal system.
India’s common law system originated in the early
1700s after the British East India Company first appeared in
Indian Territory.11 The British quickly established their
system of law in the three major cities now known as
Chennai, Mumbai, and Kolkata.12 Almost fifty years later, in
1772, the cities’ British court systems began to expand
outward into the rest of the country and quickly replaced the
old Mughal system that had been in place for over three
centuries.13
Over the next 200 years, the court systems continued
to develop and change as the British Crown took control of

Jennifer Chu, Air pollution causes 200,000 early deaths each year in the
U.S., MIT NEWS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://newsoffice.mit.edu/2013/studyair-pollution-causes-200000-early-deaths-each-year-in-the-us-0829.
11 Brief History of Law in India, THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA,
http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/about/about-the-legalprofession/legal-education-in-the-united-kingdom/ (last visited Jan. 5,
2015).
12 Id. These cities were known as Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta
respectively.
13 Id.
10
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India.14 A segregated Indian Supreme Court developed,
which excluded all legal professionals not of English, Irish,
or Scottish origin.15 In 1950, India adopted its first national
constitution16 with the goal of promoting social welfare by
empowering even the weakest members of society.17
However, the legal profession remained segregated until
1986 when the profession of law was opened to all legal
professionals regardless of race, nationality, or religion.18
Today, under the Indian Constitution, the Indian
government is structured somewhat similarly to that of the
United States.19 Although India has a parliamentary system,
it has separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches.20
The executive branch, similar to that of the U.S., is charged
with the execution of India’s laws.21 The president, who is
the head of state, ceremoniously heads this branch.22
However, for practical purposes, the prime minister, who is
head of government, leads the country with the assistance of
his cabinet members.23 The legislative branch, on the other
hand, has two primary houses of Parliament: the Rajya
Sabha and the Lok Sabha.24 These Houses of Parliament elect
the Prime Minister, who is then considered a member. The

Id.
Id.
16 THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA, supra note 11.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 SOUMYAJIT MITRA, CORP COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN INDIA
9:23 (Kochhar & Co. and Kenneth A. Cutshaw eds., 2014).
21 THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA, supra note 11.
22 MITRA, supra note 20.
23 MITRA, supra note 20.
24
Government
of
India,
ELECTIONS.IN,
http://www.elections.in/government/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
14
15
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executive and legislative branches, much like the U.S., are
required to work closely with each other.25 Both the
executive and legislative branches have limited powers, and
the judiciary acts as a check on both branches.26
The similarities between the U.S. judiciary and Indian
judiciary are largely procedural. Similar to the U.S., a key
role of the Indian judiciary is to interpret the Constitution so
as to uphold the constitutional values that the framers
envisioned and to safeguard the fundamental rights of
individuals.27 While India’s Constitution originally
envisioned a Supreme Court with one Chief Justice and
seven other judges, the legislature has rapidly expanded that
number to thirty judges.28 Interestingly, the proceedings in
the Supreme Court of India are conducted solely in English,
as mandated by the Indian Constitution.29
II.

COMMON LAW AND COMMON GROUND: A PRELEGISLATIVE DISCUSSION

With a basic understanding of the Indian
governmental structure in mind, this paper proceeds by
exploring the development of the environmental fields in
both countries before diving into the current state of affairs
in India and the United States. Exploring each country’s
environmental background is central to fully appreciating
the distinctions that exist today. The roots of environmental

Id.
See id.
27 MITRA, supra note 20.
28
History,
SUPREME
COURT
OF
INDIA,
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/history.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
29 Id.
25
26
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law in both India and the United States came in the form of
public and private nuisance claims under common law.30
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a public nuisance as “an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public, such as a condition dangerous to health,
offensive to community moral standards, or unlawfully
obstructing the public in the free use of public property.”31
In India, this same principle was used to prevent the public
health from being jeopardized by private businesses.32
Nuisance claims remained an important remedy in both
countries until the rapid development of codified antipollution laws during the 1960’s and 1970’s.
A. INDIA
The innate respect for environmental rights in India
can be dated back to ancient religious scripture.33 The
Arthashastra, a Sanskrit text dating back before 300 B.C.,
stated: “It [is] the dharma of each individual in society to
protect Nature, so much so that people worshipped the
objects of Nature.”34 Yet, it was not until 1905, in preindustrialized India, that the earliest reported case relating

Josh Gellers, Righting Environmental Wrongs: Assessing the Role of Legal
Systems In Redressing Environmental Grievances, 26 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
461, 478 (2011) (discussing common law remedies for environmental
claims).
31 Nuisance, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
32 Gellers, supra note 30, at 478.
33 Id. at 477.
34 Id. at 477-78 (citing Madan Lokur, Judge, Delhi High Court, IX Green
Law Lecture at Convocation Ceremony of Centre for Environmental Law
Students of WWF-India: Environmental Law: Its Development and
Jurisprudence 1 (2006)).
30
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to environmental pollution was heard.35
In J.C. Galstaun v. Dunia Lal Seal, the Calcutta High
Court of India sat in judgment of a shellac factory that was
discharging liquid effluents into a municipal drain.36 The
discharge ran through the drains and into the front yard of
the plaintiff’s home, causing both a noxious smell and a
health risk.37 Ruling in favor of the plaintiff, the court found
that the defendant had no right to release its discharge into
municipal drains and granted the plaintiff both injunctive
relief and damages.38
B. THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, similar nuisance cases began
arising in the context of environmental degradation. In
Missouri v. Illinois,39 for example, the state of Missouri sued
Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago for dumping raw
sewage into a tributary that led to the Mississippi River and
eventually to the city of St. Louis.40 Missouri claimed that, as
a result of the untreated dumping, the water that flowed
through the city was unfit to drink and had caused a

Arpita Saha, Judicial Activism in Curbing the Problem of Public Nuisance
on Environment 11 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished paper, National Law
University,
Jodhpur),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1439704.
36 Govind Narayan Sinha, A Comparative Study of the Environmental Laws
of India and the UK with Special Reference to Their Enforcement 170 (Aug.
2003) (unpublished LL.M. dissertation, University of Birmingham) (on
file with the University of Birmingham Research Archive), available at
http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/220/1/Sinha03LLM.pdf.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
40 Id.
35
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substantial increase in disease, particularly typhoid fever.41
Given the fact that there was no statutory authority for the
claim, the Court entertained Missouri’s complaint on the
grounds of public nuisance to the residents of the state of
Missouri.42 The Court found, however, that Missouri was
unable to sufficiently prove harm or causation.43 The case,
nevertheless, illustrates the historical legal theory that was
the bedrock in the U.S. common law system for claims of
environmental degradation.44
As common law nuisance began to be eclipsed by
statutory law in the 1970s, both countries took a sharp
detour away from their historical common law roots. In
India, human rights came to the forefront following a rapid
abandonment of fundamental rights. In the United States,
citizens had the luxury of creating their own social
movement based on both the intrinsic and the real value of
environmental protection. At this point, the countries’ paths
diverge.
III. BIG BANG: THE CATALYST FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT
A. INDIA: A STATE OF EMERGENCY
The catalysts for human rights in India—and thus
environmental rights—consisted of two major events in
Indian history: Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s issuance of a

Id. at 499, 517.
See id. at 518.
43 Id. at 525–26.
44 See also Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426 (1967); Madison v. Ducktown
Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904).
41
42
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state of emergency, and, later, the Bhopal disaster. Indira
Gandhi served as Prime Minister from 1966 to 1977.45 During
her term, the Allahabad High Court found Gandhi guilty of
dishonest election practices and misuse of public funds.46
The turmoil accompanying this decision led Gandhi and the
sitting President to declare a state of emergency for the
entire country.47
The Emergency period lasted from 1975 to 1977 and
brought with it a wave of civil liberty restrictions and
political changes.48 Among the liberties curtailed were
freedom of press, restrictions on political opposition, and
other fundamental rights.49 Meanwhile, the Indian
government curbed the power of the Supreme Court to
address these concerns.50 Through these amendments,
Gandhi sought to bar review of elections, including her own,
and stripped the courts of their power to review
constitutional amendments.51 The 42nd Amendment further
limited civil rights and placed restrictions on all lower courts
and any opposition movements.52
During the state of emergency, the Supreme Court
largely acquiesced to Gandhi’s rule and the restrictions
imposed on fundamental and human rights.53 After the

See Manoj Mate, The Origins of Due Process in India: The Role of
Borrowing in Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention Cases, 28 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 216, 243-45 (2010) (discussing the restriction of rights during the
state of emergency in India).
46 Id. at 243.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Mate, supra note 45, at 243.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 244.
45
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emergency era ended however, the Court took it upon itself
to repair the injuries that had been inflicted on the rights of
Indian citizens.54 Their main strategy was to strengthen
human rights protections and restore the fundamental rights
that were in theory protected under the Constitution.55 The
Court began by hearing cases of the crimes and abuses
committed by those in power during the emergency
regime.56 In addition, restrictions on the national media were
lifted and coverage of the abuses of human rights and
oppression of civil liberties began.57
Just as the Indian people were beginning to recover
from the emergency era, disaster shook the country. On the
night of December 2, 1984, in the city of Bhopal, the Union
Carbide chemical plant leaked toxic gas into the air over a
heavily populated twenty-five square mile area.58 The
resulting deaths and injuries made the tragedy one of the
worst industrial disasters in history.59 Each responsible party
shifted blame to another, and the ensuing litigation failed to
provide any acceptable future deterrent.60 In an attempt to
avoid another devastating environmental disaster, the
government of India enacted major legislative reforms.61 The

Gellers, supra note 30, at 478.
Id.
56 Mate, supra note 45, at 245.
57 Id.
58 Kathleen Crowe, Cleaning Up the Mess: Forum Non Conveniens and Civil
Liability for Large-scale Transnational Environmental Disasters, 24 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 449, 453-54 (2012).
59 Armin Rosencranz & Michael Jackson, The Delhi Pollution Case: The
Supreme Court of India and the Limits of Judicial Power, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 223, 247-48 (2003).
60 Crowe, supra note 58, at 454.
61 Rozencranz & Jackson, supra note 59, at 248.
54
55
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Indian parliament passed the Environmental Protection Act
of 1986 and the Ministry of Environment and Forests was
established.62
Even though the government had taken some steps to
remedy the problem, the magnitude and severity of both the
Bhopal disaster and Emergency Era led the judiciary to take
its own independent steps to remedy these injustices. These
two changes, the Emergency Era and the Bhopal disaster,
were the true catalysts for judicial activism and expansion of
the standing doctrine that would soon become an integral
part of environmental litigation and the health of the
country as a whole.
B. THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT
While the Indian environmental movement and
judicial activism were spurred by drastic political and
environmental changes, the U.S. environmental movement
was catalyzed by a social crusade that was much less
politically charged. Many credit the true beginning of the
environmental movement to the publishing and mass
distribution of Rachel Carson’s 1962 novel Silent Spring.63
The book discussed the ecological impacts of pesticides and
the impending ecological disasters sure to plague mankind.64
At the same time, the post-World War II climate

Id.
David Walls, Environmental Movement, SONOMA STATE UNIVERSITY (last
visited
Nov.
9
2014),
http://www.sonoma.edu/users/w/wallsd/environmentalmovement.shtml#mainContent.
64 Claire Riegelman, Environmentalism: A Symbiotic Relationship Between A
Social Movement and U.S. Law, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 522, 532
(2009).
62
63
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brought Americans increased income, a higher standard of
living, and a shift from war to a focus on
environmentalism.65 With more free time and money, people
began to take advantage of the natural resources around
them for their recreational and aesthetic value.66 The
contribution of far more cars and highways simultaneously
helped expand the number of National Park visits from 12
million in 1946 to 282 million by 1979.67 Technology
continued to expand with economic development, and the
health of the land, animals, and people in the U.S. began to
feel the impact.68 With the contemporaneously advancing
levels of education, perceptions about the intrinsic and real
value of the environment underwent a radical
transformation, and a social movement was born.69
The environmental movement began to put pressure
on the government to implement national environmental
laws and regulations.70 In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
three prominent environmental groups formed, which still
play a powerful and vital role in shaping environmental law
today: The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the
Environmental Defense Fund, and the Natural Resources
Defense Fund.71 In conjunction with the larger
environmental groups, public demonstrations, meetings,
media reports, and petitions were all used to pressure
lawmakers and the Executive to act.72 When laws were

Walls, supra note 63.
Riegelman, supra note 64 at 534.
67 Walls, supra note 63.
68 Riegelman, supra note 64, at 534.
69 Walls, supra note 63.
70 Riegelman, supra note 64, at 537.
71 Id. at 534.
72 Id. at 536.
65
66
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eventually passed, the movement took to the courts to
enforce and strengthen the progress that had been made.73
This national social pressure helped lead an environmentally
conservative judiciary to bend to the will of the whole and
effect permanent change in the area of environmental law.
IV. ROLLING STONES: THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
JURISPRUDENCE
A. INDIA
The Indian court’s willingness to embrace judicial
activism did not end with the Emergency Era. Since then, the
Courts have continued to reinvent themselves, assuming the
role of “the last resort of the oppressed and bewildered.”74
One of their most powerful tools in advancing and
facilitating the rights of the oppressed has been their display
of activism through their liberal interpretation of locus
standi—the Indian version of standing.75 Possibly the most
important and significant difference between the Indian
doctrine and that of the U.S. is that India’s is not grounded
in the Constitution.76 Still, to warrant locus standi, Indian
litigants must show both that their rights were violated and
that the issue is capable of resolution through the judicial
process.77 Because of this lack of constitutional grounding,

Thomas M. Merrill, Foreword: Two Social Movements, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q.
331, 332 (1994).
74 Rozencranz & Jackson, supra note 59, at 229-30.
75 See id.
76 Gellers, supra note 30, at 476.
77 S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 29, 70 (2001).
73
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Indian courts have been able to mold locus standi to more
effectively achieve their goals.
The first real activist role that the courts played was
in restoring the judges who had been transferred from their
positions during, and as a result of, Ghandi’s state of
emergency.78 Rather than waiting for the judges themselves
to bring suit, the Supreme Court, for the first time, allowed
legal bar associations to bring suit on their behalf.79
Bystanders could now file suit on behalf of the injured
without suffering personal harm themselves.80 These
decisions ushered in the beginning of a massive expansion
not only of locus standi law, but also of judicial activism.81
The so-called Judges’ Transfer Case opened the door
for a whole new type of standing jurisprudence best
described as representative standing and citizen standing.82
Representative standing allows for an individual to file suit
on behalf of someone who cannot approach the court
themselves for reasons of poverty, disability, inability, or
social or economic disadvantage.83 The Court has extended
this principle even further to allow an individual with
sufficient interest to sue “in his own rights as a member of
the citizenry to whom a public duty is owed.”84 Citizen

Gellers, supra note 30, at 476-77.
Susan D. Susman, Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of
Standing in Public Interest Litigation, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 57, 58 (1994).
80 Michael G. Faure & A.V. Raja, Effectiveness of Environmental Public
Interest Litigation in India: Determining the Key Variables, 21 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 239, 249 (2010).
81 See Gellers, supra note 30, at 476.
82 Clark D. Cunningham, Public Interest Litigation in Indian Supreme Court:
A Study in the Light of American Experience, 29 J. OF THE INDIAN L. INST.
494, 498-500 (1987).
83 Id. at 499.
84 Id. at 501.
78
79
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standing allows individuals to bring claims that are so
diffuse and commonly shared that no individual legal rights
would otherwise be sufficiently infringed upon.85 Citizens
no longer have to suffer a personal injury to bring a claim for
something they feel aggrieved by. With the advent of these
remarkably relaxed standing laws, citizens were able to
challenge governmental actions in the “public interest,” and
thus public interest litigation was born.86
The Court’s enabling of public interest litigation was
no accident. As a way of redressing issues unsolved by the
other two branches, the Court displayed patent judicial
activism and sought to foster a trend. Reduced standing
requirements, and the subsequent rapid growth of public
interest litigation, had an especially strong impact on
environmental protection. When governmental action or
inaction threatened the environment, ordinary citizens could
now bring suit on behalf of the general public, and the court
pledged to be exceptionally receptive to the challenges. The
environmental jurisprudence that has followed has
continued to further expand the judicial activism that was
first displayed by the Court in the Judges’ Transfer Cases.
Along with considerable weakening of locus standi
requirements, the Supreme Court of India also virtually
eliminated the formalities and requirements involved in
filing writs of certiorari.87 In 1987, it communicated this
directive clearly in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India.88 The case

Id. at 501.
Faure & Raja, supra note 80, at 249.
87 Bharat H. Desai, Enforcement of the Right to Environment Protection
Through Public Interest Litigation in India, 33 INDIAN J. OF INT’L L. 27 (1993).
88 See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ALLIANCE
WORLDWIDE (Dec. 20, 1986), http://www.elaw.org/node/1322 (last
visited Feb. 8 2015).
85
86
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involved the aftermath of a gas leak at a food and fertilizer
facility.89 Defendants objected to the suit on the grounds that
the plaintiffs improper writ amendment should preclude
their filing of a claim.90 The Court, however, stated that
procedure was “merely a hand-maiden of justice” and
should not stand in the way of the ordinary citizen’s access
to the courts.91
[W]here the poor and the disadvantaged are
concerned who are barely eking out a
miserable existence with their sweat and toil
and who are victims of an exploited society
without any access to justice, this Court will
not insist on a regular writ petition and even a
letter addressed by a public spirited individual
or a social action group acting pro bono
publico would suffice to ignite the jurisdiction
of this Court.92
The Court went on to hold that the letter requesting
writ does not even need to be addressed to the Chief Justice
or the Court in general, but can be addressed to any
individual justice.93 The Court reasoned that “poor and
disadvantaged person[s] or social action group[s]” may not
be aware of the proper procedure or form of address.94 They
may simply be aware of a judge from their state and a letter

Id.
Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ALLIANCE WORLDWIDE, supra note 88.
94 Id.
89
90
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to that judge would be wholly acceptable.95 Insisting
otherwise would “deny access to justice to the deprived and
vulnerable sections of the community.”96 Once again, the
Court took a purely human rights based approach in their
decision and in doing so, radically altered the law.
In 1985, the Indian Supreme Court opined on what it
proclaimed was the “first case of its kind in the country
involving issues relating to environmental and ecological
balance.”97 Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh was
brought to stop the continued operation of limestone
quarries in the Himalayan Mountains, which had been the
source of considerable environmental degradation for a
substantial amount of time.98 In ruling in favor of the
plaintiffs, the Court relied heavily on the information it
obtained from a self-appointed committee established to
report on the quality of the quarries.99
By appointing a committee at all, the Court
proactively played an activist role before even deciding the
case. In the opinion, the Court discusses the findings of its
own committee before immediately discussing the findings
of the Committee that “it seems the Government of India
also appointed.”100 The Water Act gives the power to
appoint committees not to the judiciary, but to the Central
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and State Boards of the Department of Environment.101 To
further emphasize this new sense of power, the Court went
on to specifically direct the Department of Environment to
form an additional committee and to “nominate,” within
four weeks, specific individuals that the Court identified for
continued evaluation of the ongoing mining operations.102
The Court’s ruling proved to be a positive step for the
Indian environmental movement, but was also a substantial
overstepping of their established judicial boundaries.103 By
acting on their own to appoint and prescribe committees, the
Court cloaked itself in legislative power and, in doing so,
began to foster animosity with the other branches of
government.104 As the first real environmental case to reach
the Indian Supreme Court, the judiciary set a precedent of
environmental activism that would continue to expand in
the coming years.
In 1991, in Subhashkumar v. State of Biharm, the Indian
Supreme Court reiterated another radical change in the area
of environmental law.105 The case dealt with the discharge of
waste sludge into the Bokaro River.106 While discussing the
environmental harm, the Court referred to Article 21 of the
Indian Constitution, which states, “no person shall be
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
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procedure established by law.”107 Building on the
longstanding acceptance that Article 21 embodied all
fundamental rights, the Court then declared that Article 21
“includes the right of enjoyment of pollution free water and
air for full enjoyment of life.”108 In one short sentence, the
Court made access to a clean environment a fundamental
right. While the Court had previously touched on this idea,
the clear declaration in this case proved crucial to the
Court’s continued environmental activism.109
Though brought to the courts as a public interest case,
the suit failed on its merits because the Court determined
that it was brought for the petitioner’s personal interest,
rather than the public’s.110 The Court’s holding, however,
exemplifies the human rights justification behind its new
environmental jurisprudence. The Court would allow the
extremely lax standing laws to legitimately promote the
public interest, but restricted the use of the new lenient
system for personal gain.
In T. Ramakrishna Rao v. Hyderabad Urban Development,
the Court took the environmental rights principle one step
further by explicitly stating that, “[t]he slow poisoning of the
atmosphere caused by the environmental pollution and
spoliation should be regarded as amounting to [a] violation
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”111 It is therefore
“the legitimate duty of the Courts as the enforcing organs of

Id.; INDIA CONST. art. 21.
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the constitutional objectives to forbid all actions of the State
and the citizens from upsetting the ecological and
environmental balance.”112 To pollute the environment is to
violate the Indian Constitution and the fundamental rights
of all Indian people. In addition to the existence of
representative standing and relaxed locus standi, public
interest warriors now have a definitive constitutional
violation of a public fundamental right to allege as an injury
in fact.
After years of blatant judicial activism by the Indian
courts, individuals who need to challenge a human rights or
environmental violation in the public’s interest can now be
represented by someone else, file a writ with a simple letter,
challenge the degradation of nature as a violation of their
constitutional rights, and rely on the courts to make a
proactive decision for the betterment of the environment.
The line between the law and moral righteousness has been
bridged, but the true consequences of these decisions have
yet to be seen.
B. THE UNITED STATES
In the U.S., judicial activism played a much subtler
role in the development of environmental law. Prior to the
environmental and social movements that came in the
1970’s, the U.S. Supreme Court had previously acted
primarily to slow environmental protections emanating from
legislative bodies, and aimed to maintain its historically
conservative role in environmental law.113 However, as the
environmental movement grew, environmentalists began to
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use the court system to enforce the laws passed by Congress,
and the judiciary took on a more activist position.114 The
courts started to support and help further the social and
economic interests that had become an evident part of
modern America.115 While legislation was a critical part of
the movement, the courts played an important role in
effectuating environmental protection through their
interpretation of the law.116 Rather than producing opinions
that narrowly construed or struck down legislative
initiatives, the courts began to liberally construe legislation,
and they “became open fora for groups seeking recognition
of new rights going beyond what legislatures were prepared
to grant.”117 The judiciary itself became an agent of social
change.
One of the most significant consequences of this
judicial activism was the Supreme Court’s liberal expansion
of legal standing requirements—especially as they apply to
environmental rights. Environmental law and standing are
intrinsically linked in the United States because standing
laws often create substantial barriers for environmental
litigation. As such, while the Court was sure to temper its
displays of environmental activism, its expansions of the
environmental standing doctrine was still one of its most
prominent displays of that activism.
Article III of the U.S. Constitution has been
interpreted to require an individual to demonstrate that they
have personally suffered an articulable injury that was
caused by a defendant’s actions before the individual can
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See Merrill, supra note 73, at 332.
116 Riegelman, supra note 64, at 537.
117 Merrill, supra note 73, at 332.
114
115

238

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 23

maintain a lawsuit.118 Furthermore, a ruling in that
individual’s favor must have the potential to redress the
specific injury that the person is facing.119 These principles
have proven uniquely difficult to apply to environmental
claims.
In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,
Inc., the Supreme Court explained that “the relevant
showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not injury
to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”120 The
standing doctrine, therefore, precludes any litigation on
behalf of direct injury to a specific ecosystem that does not
directly injure the individual plaintiff. This judicial
interpretation of the standing doctrine “effectively removes
ecosystems and other life from any direct claim to justice.”121
This formulation of the standing doctrine requires that an
ecosystem be utilized in some way by human beings before
it can be protected from those same human beings—a
valuation system that is often paradoxical.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sierra Club v. Morton,
demonstrated one of the most significant displays of
environmental activism when the Court addressed the
standing requirement of injury in fact.122 In the late 1960’s,
Walt Disney sought to develop a ski resort in Mineral King
Valley, a wilderness and recreation area directly adjacent to
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Sequoia National Park.123 The Sierra Club challenged the
development as a contravention of federal laws and
regulations governing the preservation of national parks,
forests, and game refuges.124 The Sierra Club claimed
standing to challenge the actions as a “corporation with a
special interest in the conservation and the sound
maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests
of the country.”125 Furthermore, the Sierra Club alleged it
would suffer a direct injury as a result of the development of
the valley because the development “would destroy or
otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic
objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the
enjoyment of the park for future generations.”126 At this
point, for the purposes of standing, non-economic injuries to
widely shared interests had never been squarely addressed
or recognized by the Court.127
In addressing this issue, the Court chose to break new
ground and articulated two important rules of law. First, it
held that the aesthetic and environmental interests that the
Sierra Club sought to protect sufficiently rose to the level of
“injury in fact” adequate to lay the basis for standing under
the Administrative Procedure Act.128 The fact that
environmental interests are shared by many rather than just
a few does not make them any less deserving of legal
protection.129 Second, the Court held that the party seeking
review must be among the class of people personally injured
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by the action.130 “A mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter
how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified
the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not
sufficient by itself to render the organization ‘adversely
affected’ or ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of the
[Administrative Procedures Act].”131 As such, the Court held
the Sierra Club lacked standing to challenge the
development.132 Still, a personal aesthetic environmental
interest alone—along with a showing that the plaintiff was
directly injured in this way—was now considered sufficient
injury under Article III of the Constitution. The novel step
that the Court took in this case still remains relevant today.
While the majority opined on what would become
one of the most important environmental cases to date, the
dissenting opinions similarly revealed their activist
inclinations and laid important precedent for environmental
scholars to come. A shining light in the case was Justice
Douglas’ dissent, wherein he voiced a desire so often
intoned by environmentalists across the country.
The critical question of ‘standing' would be
simplified and also put neatly in focus if we
fashioned a federal rule that allowed
environmental issues to be litigated . . . in the
name of the inanimate object about to be
despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and
bulldozers and where injury is the subject of
public
outrage. Contemporary
public
concern for protecting nature's ecological
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equilibrium should lead to the conferral of
standing upon environmental objects to sue for
their own preservation.133
With his now legendary dissent, Justice Douglas took
a true activist role and urged the Court to “fashion” a new
rule for environmental law. He even ventured so far as to
urge the Court to base its decision on “contemporary public
concern.”134 Despite his urging, the majority failed to find his
reasoning compelling. Perhaps the transparent judicial
activism that Justice Douglas displayed was too much too
soon for the majority, whose opinion had already taken a
novel departure from the stricter standing doctrine. Or
perhaps the Court simply found Justice Douglas’s level of
judicial activism to be unacceptable. Whatever the reason,
the Court today has still never given life to Justice Douglas’s
pioneering recommendation. However, over forty years
later, his dissent continues to play an important role in the
scholarly discussions of environmental law.
In the years following Morton, the Court reversed
course and again began to apply “reinvigorated and more
restrictive” standing rules for cases dealing with
environmental issues.135 As the Court noted in a 1992 case,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, “when the plaintiff is not
himself the object of the government action or inaction he
challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily
‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”136
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While the Court’s majority opinions continued to
avoid liberal interpretations in environmental cases, the
debate continued among the Justices over whether or not
Congress has the power to confer standing for
environmental cases where no cognizable direct injury to the
person had occurred. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in
Lujan found this type of congressional standing insufficient
under Article III of the constitution.137
The court held that the injury-in-fact
requirement
had
been satisfied
by
congressional conferral upon all persons of an
abstract,
self-contained,
noninstrumental
“right” to have the Executive observe the
procedures required by law. We reject this
view . . . . A plaintiff raising only a generally
available grievance about government—
claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s
interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him
than it does the public at large—does not state
an Article III case or controversy.138
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy, in his
concurrence joined by Justice Souter, adopted a much more
liberal perspective, opining that “Congress has the power to
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
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before.”139 Justice Kennedy recognized the potential for
statutes to define and provide for specific constitutionally
cognizable injuries as a result of a statutory violation.140
While he did not find the statute in this case sufficient, he
expressed his willingness to find this type of conferral in
other cases and opened the door for further expansion in the
future.141 His rationale also provides a potential solution for
conservationists seeking to get their environmental cases
through the courthouse doors.
While the Court followed Morton with almost a
decade of stricter environmental standing, the Court in 2000
retreated from these strict standards and embraced a new
era of activism. The Supreme Court notably expanded the
protections offered by the Court with its adaptive
interpretation of both injury and redressability.142 What has
still not changed, however, is that the relevant showing for
Article III standing “is not injury to the environment but
injury to the plaintiff.”143
In 2007, the Court fostered its progressive position in
Massachusetts v. EPA.144 In Massachusetts, the state challenged
the EPA’s denial of a petition for rulemaking under the
Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles.145 Massachusetts claimed that humanemitted greenhouse gas emissions are a significant
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contribution to global climate change and the resulting rise
in sea level would lead to a significant loss in
Massachusetts’s coastal property.146
Quoting Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in
Lujan, where he asserted that Congress “has the power to
define injury and authorize chains of causation,” the Court
found that the Clean Air Act authorizes this type of
challenge to the EPA’s actions.147 It proceeded to address the
issue of particularized injury and explicitly held that states
are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal
jurisdiction. In order for Massachusetts to protect its quasisovereign interests, the state is entitled to “special solitude”
in the standing analysis.148 Under the confines of this unique
analysis, the Court found that the EPA’s failure to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions presented an injury to
Massachusetts and its coastline that was both actual and
imminent.149
The Court surprisingly accepted a significant causal
link in order to find injury in fact: The EPA’s failure to
regulate a limited amount of greenhouse gases affected the
global climate enough that it would result in a tangible rise
in sea level that would erode the coastline and thereby injure
Massachusetts. Furthermore, this was the first time the
Court read a statute to find that Congress had implicitly
authorized environmental standing. Despite these displays
of activism, the Court softened its pro-environmental
decision with the stipulation that states are “special
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litigants” for the purpose of this environmental standing.150
While Massachusetts v. EPA was certainly a victory for
the environmental movement, it also illustrates the
continued restraints—constitutional, political, and perhaps
societal—within which the judiciary operates. Nonetheless,
the Court’s activist role intermittently broke through these
restraints and the Court left a lasting impression on the
environmental movement. From its first step of recognizing
the aesthetic value of nature, to its most recent steps of
finding standing in statutes and validating attenuated
environmental injuries, the Court has played an important
role in the construction of environmental policy.
V. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
A. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
While both Indian courts and United States courts
have taken an activist role in some sense through their
environmental rulings, the courts in India have clearly taken
their judicial activism far beyond that of U.S. courts. The U.S.
Supreme Court certainly pushed the boundaries of
established doctrine in cases like Sierra Club v. Morton151 and
Massachusetts v. EPA,152 but the Indian Supreme Court
formed an entirely new set of laws. This significant
divergence in activism is partially attributable to the Indian
Court’s interpretation of Article 21 as encompassing the
fundamental right to a clean environment. By establishing
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this principle in Subhashkumar v. State of Biharm153 and its
progeny, the Indian Supreme Court hugely legitimized the
power they were already acquiring and using.
By recognizing the existence of such a right, the
Indian Supreme Court’s environmental and human rights
decisions now rely on constitutional interpretation, and the
Court is simply enforcing the Constitution’s protection of
fundamental rights.154 The Indian Supreme Court took the
power to effect both environmental protection and harm
definitively out of the hands of the legislature, and placed it
soundly into the hands of the judiciary. As a result, the
environment in India is now significantly more protected
from the whims and changing power of the government,
and is shielded from political corruption in the executive
and legislative branches. With a stroke of genius, the Indian
courts have claimed jurisdiction to decide environmental
issues, even in the absence of statutory authority. The Indian
courts picked up the ball where the legislature dropped it.
While the strong activism in Indian courts is partially
justified by Article 21, the courts still far exceeded the
boundaries of their judicial power. For example, in
Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Indian
Supreme Court not only formed a fact-finding committee
itself, but also went as far as to instruct the Department of
Environment to form an additional committee and also
inform the Department whom it was required to nominate.
Even considering the added support of a constitutional
provision, the Court largely exceeded its judicial limits by
explicitly contradicting a relevant statute.
In assuming this essentially legislative role, the Indian
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courts today continue to protect the environment and its
health. However, it is important to keep in mind that their
ongoing efforts to increase environmental protections still
remain relatively vulnerable to the changing climate of the
courts. The judiciary is still a volatile and unelected branch
of government. Environmental protections provided by the
Court have the potential to be abused by an equally antienvironmental judiciary in the future. Because the courts
granted themselves so much discretion over the fate of the
environment and because India’s environment teeters so
close to the edge, an anti-environmental judiciary could have
disastrous consequences for the people of India and the
resources upon which they so heavily rely. The precarious
state of India’s environment and the health and survival of
its people would likely preclude a radical shift from this
stance. However, an unelected judiciary can always change
their minds regardless of the political climate.
One reason the U.S. Supreme Court, in contrast, never
made such drastic quasi-legislative moves is because it
blatantly lacks a constitutional provision or legislative
directive granting it that power. Not only does the U.S.
Constitution fail to provide a positive right to environmental
protection, but also Article III, as interpreted, actively
inhibits the courts from significantly altering standing
jurisprudence in favor of environmentalism. The mandates
of injury, causation, and redressability must always be met.
Yet, in order to meet the mandate of injury in fact, “the
relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is
not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”155
This is in stark contrast to the Indian court’s interpretation of
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, where “[t]he slow
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poisoning of the atmosphere caused by environmental
pollution and spoliation” is regarded as a direct
constitutional violation in and of itself, regardless of whether
the land is being actively utilized or not.156 The U.S. Supreme
Court has regrettably failed to recognize the scientific fact
that continued injury to the connected environment that we
all share will inevitably result in injury to the health and
wellbeing of all people.
One potential solution to this Article III limitation
would be for the Court and Congress to further develop
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan II. Theoretically,
Congress has the “power to define injury and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before.”157 In Massachusetts
v. EPA, the Court found that the Clean Air Act and
Massachusetts’ status as a state confer “special solitude” on
them for the purposes of standing.158 Congress could further
this trend by defining certain environmental degradation as
an injury in itself and thereby confer standing on individual
citizens to seek redress for injury to the environment.
Subsequently, the courts could expand on Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence and continue the trend that began in
Massachusetts v. EPA. Consequently, the solution for
environmentalists in the U.S. could lie with the legislature
and the Court’s continued willingness to expand this notion.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL NECESSITY
Another possible explanation for the countries’
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diverging levels of activism is necessity. In India, the
Emergency Era and the Bhopal disaster had already
devastated the country when the judiciary took up its
activist position. In a time of government corruption,
massive imfringements on civil rights, and heartbreaking
environmental disasters and conditions, the people of India
were likely looking for the very solution that the Indian
courts offered. The courts focused on rectifying the wrongs
of the era and implementing civil and human rights, and
when a significant legal requirement stood in the way, the
courts felt entitled to eliminate it. While there was
undoubtedly some opposition, the ineptitude and
sordidness of the other branches of government prevented
them from either resolving the problems or providing any
kind of real opposition to the activist judiciary.
In the U.S. on the other hand, a social movement,
rather than ecological or political necessity, spurred the
court’s limited activism. The American people became more
interested in outdoor recreation and developed the means
and time to focus on that. While environmental
organizations like the Sierra Club brought a multitude of
suits to protect the environment, the U.S. still lacked the
comparable pressure from the high level of environmental
degradation that India continues to experience. As such, a
high level of judicial activism was unacceptable from an
unelected judiciary. Furthermore, because of the
environmental social movement that was blossoming, the
stronger legislative and executive branches of the U.S.
embraced the movement and played their elected roles of
furthering the crusade and developing and enforcing
appropriate legislation. The combination of a more
supportive government, a less devastated environment, and
a contemporaneous movement towards increased civil and
environmental rights insulated the judiciary against the
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pressures that the Indian courts were forced to confront.
C. LEGISLATION
Another relevant factor for the diverging activism in
the United States and India is the stark difference in their
applicable environmental legislation. Since the late 1960’s,
the U.S. has developed strong environmental laws that are,
for the most part, enforced by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and other entities in the executive branch.
In India, however, not only are the environmental statutes
weaker, they are inherently self-limiting.159 Moreover, the
applicable agencies fail to effectively enforce them.160
India only has three environmental laws, and the last
of the laws, the Environmental Protection Act, was passed in
1986 to remedy the deficiencies in the first two Acts.161 Each
state in India has a designated Pollution Control Board that
is charged with the implementation and enforcement of the
environmental statutes.162 However, the jurisdiction of each
board is limited to “heavily polluted” areas.163 This
precludes action by any Board for any degradation less than
the “heavily polluted” standard and prohibits the
development or implementation of any preventative
measures. The Boards do not even have the authority to
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prosecute polluters independently in ordinary courts.164
This failure by the legislature to promulgate sufficient
legislation to protect both India’s environment and its
people has left a massive gap that needs to be filled. The lack
of sufficient legislation coupled with the grave state of
human rights and the environment in India may have
justifiably spurred the courts to act in the way that they did.
These factors may further explain why the Indian courts
have continued to embrace and foster public interest
litigation while the U.S. has resisted it.165
D. IMPLICATIONS OF ACTIVISM
The judicial activism in India and the United States
has had a number of important implications in each country
already and will continue to have far-reaching effects. The
significantly weakened locus standi and writ requirements in
India have led to a barrage of public interest cases entering
the courts. In some of the Indian high courts, public interest
cases have been known to take up to six years to make it
through to completion.166 In order to deal with this
onslaught of cases, the Indian government began requiring a
monetary deposit for public interest cases that would be
refunded if won, but forfeited if lost.167 Both the
overwhelming time required and the financial obligations
bring their own set of access to justice problems in India.
Furthermore, continued flagrant activism by the
courts has bred distrust towards the system and the
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government.168 Judges are not elected officials, yet they are
effectively legislating as if they were. With conflicting laws
and procedures, even the most educated of citizens may fail
to grasp which precedent is binding. Moreover, the courts
are not in the position to balance the need for environmental
protection and human rights with the need for economic
development and growth.169
It is lamentably ironic that the Indian Supreme Court,
by trying to fix the errors made by the Ghandi
administration, is actually breeding more distrust and
animosity between the government and its people, and
within the different branches of government. The courts are
fighting human degradation with a governmental power
grab. For the time being, the courts are coming down with
decisions in favor of both the environment and human
rights, but the long-term consequences of their actions and
activism may prove to be less than helpful. Until then,
India’s judicial activism will hopefully have a profoundly
positive effect on India’s environment and living conditions.
On the other hand, in the U.S., the much slower
change and milder judicial activism has mostly avoided
provoking distrust from the other branches of government
and the U.S. people. The U.S. courts have taken much less of
a pro-environment and pro-human rights position in their
opinions, but they have also been lacking the same
environmental and human rights pressure to do so.
Significantly more proficient legislation has spared the
courts from having to take a highly activist role. Stability, a
lack of recent political turmoil, and a nearly 250-year-old
Constitution have resulted in a more consistent government,
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and provided courts the luxury of generally maintaining the
status quo. The limited activism that the courts chose to
deliver has proven relatively helpful for the environmental
movement and was accomplished without causing any
major governmental instability. Courts were able to lean on
strong legislation and the knowledge that that legislation
would be enforced. In the long run, the slower move of U.S.
courts to facilitate environmental protection certainly
provides the least turmoil. But at the same time, will it ever
sufficiently embrace the true value of the environment or
acknowledge its interconnectedness? With a rapidly
changing climate, and limited time to reverse the trend, this
halfhearted attitude towards a life-sustaining resource may
prove to be our downfall.
VI. A PROPOSITION
While the Indian system and judicial activism are
shadowed by corruption and mass poverty, India’s
environmental
jurisprudence
intuitively
has
its
advantages—particularly in the area of standing. The U.S.
system has arbitrarily drawn a line to determine when an
individual is “injured enough” to be able to assert their right
to live in a healthy environment. This is inherently the
wrong way of viewing the problem. A working environment
is among the most basic and fundamental rights that we
possess as living beings. We cannot eat, we cannot breathe,
and hence, we cannot survive without an environment
functioning well enough to support our basic needs. The
U.S. Constitution provides that we shall not be deprived of
“life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness, without due
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process of law,”170 yet smog, dirty water, and a lack of
resources have the potential to dramatically shorten the
length of lives. Is that not deprivation of life in one of its
simplest forms? The Indian Supreme Court seems to think
so, and the United States should follow suit.
Furthermore, the line-drawing problem becomes even
more complicated in the context of environmental laws
because we are dealing with the global climate.
Environmental changes all across the world—not just in our
backyard—affect the health of our environment at home.
Deforestation in Alaska affects the clean air in Florida, just as
the rerouting of surface water from the Everglades affects
the quality of water in Miami. In an area so inherently
adverse to drawing lines, the courts should not turn a blind
eye to this interconnectedness when deciding who is injured
and who is not. The Court cannot determine how many trees
must be cut down across the country before the dirty air we
breath, as a result of that, shortens life spans. Proximity to
those trees should not be the determinative factor in
deciding whether enough injury exists to justify litigation. It
is time to give life to Justice Douglas’ Morton dissent, and
“protect[] nature’s ecological equilibrium” for the health of
all.171
Because the direct injury requirement can preclude a
case from ever being decided on legitimate merits—such as
the impact on global climate change—the courts should
follow the example set by India and relax the standing laws
when it comes to environmental rights. Judicial activism
does not always have to take as extreme a form as that of
India. The U.S. can learn a valuable lesson from India’s
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constitutional valuation of environmental protection without
committing to the same path of extreme activism and
political instability. The United States should, and can,
simply recognize the right to a clean environment as a
fundamental one and help protect all life on earth now and
in the future. This change would not require an
abandonment of the standing doctrine. It would simply be
an acknowledgement by the courts that environmental
degradation injures everyone. After all, what could be a
more fundamental right than the right to life?
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